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IV. Corporate Governance Generally
Application of the Business Judgment Rule and Related
Judicial Principles-Reflections from a Corporate
Accountability Perspective
Marc Z Steinberg *
I. Introduction
In a Symposium concerned with corporate accountability and governance,
one's attention naturally gravitates to the myriad of issues that have been dis-
cussed in this setting in recent years.' Yet, it is curious that, within this context,
little attention has focused on the unduly broad application of certain judicial
principles by a number of courts that permit boards of directors and manage-
ment improperly to employ a relatively large number of procedures to insulate
their actions from successful shareholder challenge.
This subject strikes at the very heart of corporate governance. Although
shareholders may care, for example, about having independent directors on their
boards or having the opportunity to present shareholder proposals,2 these inter-
ests are relatively minute when compared to their ability to bring suit either
individually or on behalf of the corporation when management has perpetrated
an alleged wrong. Yet it is in the context of shareholder challenges to manage-
ment actions that the courts have enunciated several principles which, if con-
strued too broadly, serve as a subterfuge allowing recalcitrant management to
rationalize and defend its otherwise illegal conduct. The principles permitting
management to avoid shareholder scrutiny include the inveterate business judg-
ment rule, the Burks v. Lasher3 special litigation committee scenario, certain limi-
* Special Counsel, Securities and Exchange Commission (Office of the General Counsel); Adjunct
Professor, Georgetown University Law Center. A.B., University of Michigan; J.D., University of Califor-
nia, Los Angeles; LL.M., Yale University. Member, California and District of Columbia Bars.
The Securities and Exchange Commission, as a matter of policy, disclaims responsibility for any pri-
vate publication by any of its employees. The views expressed herein are those of the author and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Commission or of the author's colleagues on the staffof the Commission.
I See, e.g., Curzan & Pelesh, Revitalizing Corporate Democracy: Control of Investment Managers' Voting on
Social Responsibility Proxy Issues, 93 HARV. L. REV. 670 (1980); Epstein, Societal, Managerial, and Legal Perspec-
tives on Corporate Social Responsibility-Product and Process, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1287 (1979); Ferrara & Stein-
berg, The Role of Inside Counsel in the Corporate Accountability Process, 4 CORP. L. REv. 3 (1981); Hetherington,
When the Sleeper Wakes: Refections on Corporate Governance and Shareholder Rights, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 183
(1979); Jones, Corporate Governance: Who Controls the Large Corporation?, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1261 (1979); Mace,
Directors: Myth and Reality-Ten Years Later, 32 RUTGERS L. REv. 293 (1979); Schwartz, Response: Some
Thoughts on the Directors' Evolving Role, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1405 (1979); Small, The Evolving Role ofthe Director
in Corporate Governance, 30 HASTINGS L.J. 1353 (1979); Stevenson, The Corporation as a Political Institution, 8
HOFSTRA L. REV. 39 (1979); Werner, Management, Stock Market and Corporate Reform. Berle and Means Recon-
sidered, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 388 (1977); Williams, Corporate Accountability andthe Lawyer's Role, 34 Bus. LAxW.
7 (1978).
2 See, e.g., Securities Exchange Act Release No. 16356 (Nov. 23, 1979); Securities Exchange Act Re-
lease No. 15384 (Dec. 6, 1978); Securities Act Release No. 6003 (Dec. 4, 1978). But see Kripke, The SEC,
Corporate Governance and the Real Issues, 36 Bus. LAW. 173 (1981).
3 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
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tations on the Goldberg v. Mendor4 rationale, the true purpose cases, and the
somewhat related disclosure of antisocial, unethical or unlawful policies ration-
ale. The above list, although by no means exhaustive, 5 will serve as the bench-
mark for this article.
Before delving into these areas, however, a caveat is in order. The author is
not urging that the foregoing principles be abrogated. As the Supreme Court has
noted, strike suits in this context are sometimes feared with good reason. 6 Mech-
anisms are undoubtedly required to combat vexatious and unfounded share-
holder litigation. 7 Further, corporations are "managed under the direction of"
their boards of directors. 8 As such, courts should normally respect, although not
necessarily acquiesce in, directors' exercise of independent judgment. 9 Neverthe-
less, if these principles are construed too broadly, they provide recalcitrant man-
agement with potent weapons to insulate its otherwise illegal actions from
successful shareholder attack.
II. Judicial Principles That Insulate Management's Actions
A. The Business Judgment Rule
Few principles are as sacred or as deep-rooted in corporate law as the busi-
ness judgment rule. The rule generally provides that corporate officers and direc-
tors, absent self-dealing or other personal interest,' 0 shall be shielded from
4 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
5 For example, another such principle is the transactional causation requirement, described by one
authority as follows:
[Wlhen a complaint alleges that the election of directors pursuant to allegedly deficient proxy
materials results in a continuation of allegedly improper and undisclosed business practices,
several courts have held that the subsequent acts are too remote from the election to provide the
requisite causal nexus between the proxy solicitation and the alleged damage.
Block & Barton, The BusinessJudgient Rule as Applted to Stockholder Proxy Derivative Suits Under the Securities
Exchange Act, 8 SEC. REG. LJ. 99, 115 (1980). See, e.g., Nemo v. Allen, 11979 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,765 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Herman v. Beretta, [1978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEc. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,574 (S.D.N.Y. 1978); In re Tenneco Securities Litigation, 11978 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L.
REP. (CCH) 96,492 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Lewis v. Elam, [1977-78 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 96,013 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Levy v. Johnson, [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
95,899 (S.D.N.Y. 1977). But see Weisberg v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 100 S. Ct. 1600 (1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789 (2d Cir. 1979).
6 See Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723 (1975):
[Iln the field of federal securities laws governing disclosure of information even a complaint
which by objective standards may have very little chance of success at trial has a settlement
value to the plaintiff out of any proportion to its prospect of success at trial so long as he may
prevent the suit from being resolved against him by dismissal or summary judgment. The very
pendency of the lawsuit may frustrate or delay normal business activity of the defendant which
is totally unrelated to the lawsuit.
Id at 740 (citations omitted).
7 Arguably, the courts may reduce the likelihood of vexatious litigation by such measures as requir-
ing plaintiffs to post security for expenses, requiring judicial review of derivative settlements, and granting
summary judgment motions. A number of states require the posting of security for expenses. See, e.g.,
CAL. CORP. CODE § 800(d) (West 1980); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:3-6(3) (West Supp. 1980); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW § 627 (McKinney Supp. 1979); MODEL Bus. CORP. AcT § 49 (1979).
8 See Corporate Director'r Handbook, 33 Bus. LAW. 1591, 1606-07 (1978).
9 See generally United Copper Sec. Co. v. Amalgamated Copper Co., 244 U.S. 261 (1977); Cramer v.
General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d Cir. 1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D.
Mich. 1980); Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Zapata Corp. v.
Maldonado, - A.2d - (Del. 1981).
10 As one commentator stated:
[Wihere a director or controlling stockholder has a material personal interest in the outcome of
a transaction or is engaged in self-dealing, it will fall to that individual to prove that the trans-
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liability for harm to the corporation resulting from their decisions if such deci-
sions "lie within the powers of the corporation and the authority of management
and were reasonably made in good faith and with loyalty and due care.""II At
least three strong policy considerations support this rule. First, if management
were liable for mere good faith errors in judgment, few capable individuals
would be willing to incur the financial and emotional risks of serving in such
roles.12 Second, courts are generally ill equipped to evaluate business judg-
ments. '3 Finally, management has the expertise to discharge the responsibility of
making such determinations.'
4
Because of these policy considerations, the business judgment rule is desira-
ble if our society's economy is to function efficiently. Like any rule of general
application, however, it can be construed so expansively that virtually any man-
agement action may be deemed reasonably made in good faith. For example, it
is beyond peradventure that members of management should premise their deci-
sions on what is in the corporation's best interests, rather than on preserving their
jobs or status.' 5 It thus arguably appears that, once the complainant demon-
strates that retention of control was a motive in management's decision, the pre-
sumption of the rule should be rebutted and the burden should shift to
management to justify the fairness of the transaction. Nonetheless, the Third
and Seventh Circuits, in construing Delaware law, both recently held that the
presumption is rebutted only where management's "sole or primary purpose" is
to retain control.' 6 Such a holding unduly expands the business judgment rule
action he or she authorized is intrinsically fair to the corporation and its stockholders. Other-
wise stated, where such a personal interest or self-dealing is shown to exist, a presumption of
overreaching arises that can be overcome only by proof of intrinsic fairness. This has been
denominated as the intrinsic fairness rule.
Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HOFSTRA L. REV. 93, 115-16 (1979) (citations omitted). See
Lewis v. S.L.&E, Inc., 629 F.2d 764, 769 (2d Cir. 1980); Blake v. National Research Assoes., Inc., 466 F.2d
570, 572 (4th Cir. 1972); Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Summa Corp., 374 A.2d 5, 9 (Del. Ch. 1977).
11 Dent, The Power of Directorr to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The Death ofthe Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw.
U.L. REV. 96, 101 (1980). For other definitions of the rule, see 3A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE
LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 1039 (rev. perm. ed. 1975); Arsht, supra note 10, at 111-12. For recent
applications of the rule, see Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,929
(7th Cir. Apr. 2, 1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980).
12 See Corporate Director's Guidebook, supra note 8, at 1603-04, 1615.
13 See Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 629, 393 N.E.2d 994, 1000, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920, 926 (1979).
14 Id
15 See, e.g., Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Tesoro Petroleum Corp., 394 F. Supp. 267, 273-74
(S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also Singer v. Magnavox Co., 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977):
"While technically not trustees [corporate directors] stand in a fiduciary relationship to the
corporation and its stockholders. . . . This rule that requires an undivided and unselfish loy-
alty to the corporation demands that there shall be no conflict between duty and self-interest.
The occasions for the determination of honesty, good faith and loyal conduct are many and
varied, and no hard and fast rule can be formulated. The standard of loyalty is measured by no
fixed scale."
Id at 977, quoting Guth v. Loft, Inc., 5 A.2d 503, 510 (1939).
16 Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981). In Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d
287 (3d Cir. 1980), the court asserted that by the very nature of corporate life "a director has a certain
amount of self-interest in everything he does." Id at 292. To alleviate this conflict, "the rule. . . postu-
lat[es] that if actions are arguably taken for the benefit of the corporation, then the directors are presumed
to have been exercising their sound business judgment rather than responding to any personal motiva-
tions." Id The court concluded that
under Delaware law, at a minimum, the plaintiff must make a showing that the sole or primary
motive of the defendant was to retain control. If he makes a showing sufficient to survive the
directed verdict, the burden then shifts to the defendant to show that the transaction in question
had a valid corporate business purpose.
Id at 293, rebling on Petty v. Pentech Papers, Inc., 347 A.2d 140, 143 (Del. Ch. 1975); Cheff v. Mathes, 41
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and, as the dissents argued in the above cases, does not comport with other Dela-
ware decisions. 17 Under such an expansive interpretation, management given
the benefit of hindsight and the advice of expert counsel can practically always
set forth some rational and proper purpose to explain its conduct. At the very
least, once the complainant presents a prima facie case that control was a motive,
management, in order to be entitled to the rule's presumption, should be re-
quired to come forward with evidence showing that a primary purpose underly-
ing its conduct was to benefit the corporation.
The business judgment rule also receives excessively broad application in the
tender offer setting. A number of courts have indicated that a target company's
management may take certain actions to defeat a hostile tender offer if in its good
faith judgment the offer is not in the corporation's best interests. 8 Target man-
agements have consequently engaged in a wide variety of defensive tactics to
thwart takeover bids, such as announcing an unprecedented dividend increase,
entering a defensive merger with a "white knight," or acquiring another corpora-
tion. 19 To shareholders denied the opportunity to tender their shares at a sub-
stantial premium, the courts' unduly broad application of the business judgment
rule appears inherently unfair. Under such an interpretation, "[r]egardless of the
tactic employed, management can easily manufacture a 'legitimate' corporate
purpose for its action, even when it employed the tactic solely to perpetuate its
own status." 20 Such a consequence seems practically assured when management
Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del. Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405 (1962). Butsee Tread-
way Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357, 382 (2d Cir. 1980) (under New Jersey law, "[olnce a plaintiff
demonstrates that a director had an interest in the transaction at issue, the burden shifts to the defendant
to prove that the transaction was fair and reasonable to the corporation"). See generally Gruenbaum, Defen-
slie Tactics and the Business Judgment Rile, 4 CORP. L. REv. 263 (1981); Comment, Buying Out Insurgent
Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE L.J. 308 (1960).
17 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) [ 97,929, at 90,746 (7th
Cir. Apr. 2, 1981) (Cudahy, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Trueblood, 629 F.2d 287, 301 (3d Cir. 1980)
(Rosenn, J., dissenting). In his dissent injohnson, Judge Rosenn stated:
Unlike the majority, I believe that under Delaware law, once plaintiff has shown that the desire
to retain control was a motive in the particular business decision under challenge, the burden is
then on the defendant to move forward with evidence justifying the transaction as primarily in
the corporation's best interests.
/ at 301,reoybigon Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548, 554 (1964); Bennett v. Propp, 41 Del.
Ch. 14, 187 A.2d 405, 409 (1962). See also Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980);
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
18 See, e.g., Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Crouse-Hinds Company v.
InterNorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980); Treadway Cos. v. Care Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980);
Berman v. Gerber Products Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978). For commentary taking this
position, see Fleischer, Business Judgment Rule Protects Takeover Targets, Legal Times (Wash.) Apr. 14, 1980, at
15: Herzel, Schmidt, & Davis, Why Corporate Directors Have a Right to Resist Tender Ofers, 3 COR'. L. REV.
107 (1980); Lipton, Takeover Bids in the Target's Boardroom, 35 Bus. LAW. 101 (1979); Steinbrink, Manage-
ment's Response to the Takeover Attempt, 28 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 882 (1978).
19 See cases cited note l8supra; Humana, Inc. v. American Medicorp, Inc., [1977-78 Transfer Binder]
FED. SEc. L. REP. (CCH) 96,286 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 1978); Applied Digital Data Sys., Inc. v. Milgo Elec.
Corp., 425 F. Supp. 1145 (S.D.N.Y. 1977); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Monogram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer
Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 29, 1976).
20 Lynch & Steinberg, The Legitimacy of Defensive Tactics in Tender Oers, 64 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 926
(1979). See generally Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981) (Cudahy, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Judge Cudahy stated:
Unfortunately, the majority here has moved one giant step closer to shredding whatever
constraints still remain upon the ability of corporate directors to place self-interest before share-
holder interest in resisting a hostile tender offer for control of the corporation. There is abun-
dant evidence in this case to go to the jury on the state claims for breach of fiduciary duty. I
emphatically disagree that the business judgment rule should clothe directors, battling blindly
to fend off a threat to their control, with an almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business
[June 19811
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utilizes expert counsel and investment bankers to lay a foundation for and to
structure its anti-takeover actions.
To avoid this perverse result, courts should at the very least inquire whether
the principal objective of management's actions was to benefit the subject corpo-
ration or to impede the tender offer.2 ' One significant (although by no means
determinative) consideration should be whether the decision to oppose the take-
over bid and to engage in defensive maneuvers was made primarily by disinter-
ested directors or by those directors whose very livelihood and economic interests
depended on the continued separate existence of the subject corporation.
22
B. The Burks v. Lasker Special Litigation Committee Scenario
A relatively new defensive strategy in response to a shareholders' derivative
suit against members of a corporation's board of directors is for the corporation's
board to appoint a special litigation committee composed of disinterested
nondefendant directors. The extent to which such a committee can rely on the
business judgment rule in terminating such suits is highly controversial and has
been the subject of increasing scrutiny by both the courts
23 and commentators.24
Further, it is important to keep in mind that the application of the business judg-
judgment, prevailing over everything but the elusive hobgoblins of fraud, bad faith or abuse of
discretion.
Id at 299. Judge Cudahy asserted that "[t]his case announces to stockholders (if they did not know it
before) that they are on their own and may expect little consideration and less enlightenment from their
board of directors when a tender offeror appears to challenge the directors for control." Id at 312. Ac-
cordingly, "only the submission to jury verdict of cases like this one can restore confidence in our system of
corporate governance." Id
21 See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225, 233 (9th Cir. 1975); Royal Indus., Inc. v. Mono-
gram Indus., Inc., [1976-77 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 95,863, at 91,136 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
24, 1976).
22 See Gelfond & Sebastian, Reevaluating the Duties of Target Management in a Hostile Tender Ofer, 60
B.U.L. REV. 403, 472 (1980); Williams, Role of Directors in Takeover Offers, 13 REv. SEC. REG. 963 (1980). See
also Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981), where Judge Cudahy stated:
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are, at the very least, "interested"
in their own positions of power, prestige and prominence (and in their not inconsequential
perquisites). They are "interested" in defending against outside attack the management which
they have, in fact, installed or maintained in power-"their" management (to which, in many
cases, they owe their directorships). And they are "interested" in maintaining the public repu-
tation of their own leadership and stewardship against the claims of "raiders" who say that they
can do better. Thus, regardless of their technical "independence," directors of a target corpora-
tion are in a very special position, where the slavish application of the majority's version of the
good faith presumption is particularly disturbing.
Id at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Moreover, it should be recognized
that management will often be able to influence outside directors. See Mite Corp. v. Dixon, 633 F.2d 486,
494-95 (7th Cir. 1980),prob.jur. noted, 49 U.S.L.W. 3824 (May 4, 1981).
23 See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir.
1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 206 (1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 724 (8th Cir. 1979), cert.
denied, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980);
Siegal v. Merrick, 84 F.R.D. 106 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Lewis v. Adams, No. 77-266C (N.D. Okla. Nov. 15,
1979); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, - A.2d - (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393
N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
24 See, e.g., Coffee & Schwartz, The Survival of the Derivative Suit. An Evaluation anda Proposalfor Legislative
Reform, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 261 (1981). Dent, The Power of Directors to Terminate Shareholder Litigation: The
Death of the Derivative Suit?, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 96 (1980); Gammon, Derivative Suits, 12 REV. SEC. REG. 887
(1979); Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Terminate Shareholder Derivative Suits, 35 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 1 (1980); Comment, The BusinessJudgment Rule in Derivative Suits Against Directors, 65 CORNELL L.
REV. 600 (1980).
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ment rule in this context "is an expansion of the traditional rule."'25
In the seminal case of Burks v. Lasker, 2 the Supreme Court found two ques-
tions to be dispositive in determining whether federal court dismissal of share-
holder derivative suits against board members is proper: (1) whether the
applicable state law permits the disinterested directors to terminate shareholder
derivative suits against fellow directors, and (2) whether such a state rule is con-
sistent with the policies underlying the federal securities laws. 27 Of course, if
dismissal is sought in state court, the only determination is whether relevant state
law authorizes such dismissal.
28
Subsequent to Burks, a number of federal and state courts have addressed
this subject with varying results. As a generalization, at one end of the spectrum
are decisions that construe state law so as to permit dismissal in any type of ac-
tion, including those premised on self-dealing by defendant directors, 29 and that
decline to recognize any federal policy as conflicting with such interpretation of
state law.a0 A number of these decisions place the burden upon the shareholder
to show that the special litigation committee was biased.3 1 At the other end of
the spectrum are decisions that construe state law so as to preclude dismissal in
apparently all situations.32 The middle position generally is occupied by those
courts that assess the special litigation committee's independence and good faith,
the reasonableness of the committee's decision, the type of conduct alleged to
have been involved, and the presence of any strong federal policies.3 3
It should be stressed that courts in the first group above provide manage-
ment with practically free reign to terminate shareholder derivative suits against
directors.3 4 Toward this end, management frequently appoints nondefendant
disinterested directors to the special litigation committee and retains outside
counsel of unimpeachable integrity. After hearing witnesses and examining doc-
umentary evidence, the committee, with the special counsel's concurrence, nor-
mally issues a comprehensive report concluding that the corporation's best
interests would not be served by the suit due to its improbability of success, its
exorbitant cost, and its tendency to disrupt company business, and lower em-
ployee morale. Relying on the committee's report, the corporation seeks to dis-
25 Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 689 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
26 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
27 Id at 480, 486.
28 See, e.g., Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, - A.2d - (Del. 1981); Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619,
393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1979).
29 See, e.g., Gaines v. Haughton, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,000 (9th Cir. May 18, 1981);
Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d 778 (9th Cir. 1979); Abramowitz v. Posner, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCHI) 97,921 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 1981); Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).
30 See note 29 supra.
31 See, e.g., Lewis v. Anderson, 615 F.2d at 783; Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d at 633-35, 393 N.E.2d
at 1002-03, 419 N.Y.S.2d at 928-29; Falkenberg v. Baldwin, SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 545, A-14
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 3, 1980).
32 See, e.g., Abella v. Universal Leaf Tobacco, Inc., 495 F. Supp. 713 (E.D. Va. 1980); Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 490 F. Supp. 348 (S.D. Tex. 1980); Maldonado v. Flynn, 413 A.2d 1251 (Del. Ch. 1980),
reversed andremanded, - A.2d - (Del. 1981).
33 See, e.g., Galef v. Alexander, 615 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1980); Abbey v. Control Data Corp., 603 F.2d 778
(8th Cir. 1979), cert. dented, 444 U.S. 1017 (1980); Cramer v. General Tel. & Elecs. Corp., 582 F.2d 259 (3d
Cir. 1979); Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, -
A.2d - (Del. 1981) (court should (1) inquire into independence and good faith of committee and bases
supporting its conclusions and (2) apply its own independent business judgment).
34 See generally Steinberg, The Use of Special Litigation Committees to Temzinate Shareholder Derivative Suits,
35 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (1980).
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miss the complaint.35 With the burden of proof on the shareholders, these courts
find an additional basis upon which to grant the motion.
36
This is not to imply that special litigation committee investigations are nec-
essarily shams. These committees and their special counsel may ferret out vexa-
tious litigation as well as nonfrivolous actions that are not in the corporation's
best interests. Nonetheless, the apparent pressure on committee members to dis-
count the corporation's interests when fellow directors are sued should lead a
court to scrutinize the type of conduct (e.g., corporate mismanagement as op-
posed to self-dealing) alleged to have occurred and the reasonableness of the
committee's determination. 3 7 Further, because the defendant directors selected
the members of the committee, the appearance (and perhaps the presence) of
impropriety and unfairness to the shareholders should place the burden of estab-
lishing the committee's independence upon the movant.38 In this regard, to help
ensure that the committee members were not subject to the defendants' influence
and had exercised independent judgment on the corporation's behalf, any prior
contacts or relationships between committee members and defendants should be
rigorously examined.
39
C. Certain Limitations on the Goldberg v. Meridor Rationale
In Santa Fe Zndustries, Inc. v. Green,40 the Supreme Court held that section
10(b) and rule 10b-5 did not reach breaches of fiduciary duty not involving de-
ception or manipulation. 4 1 One argument advanced by the plaintiff-sharehold-
ers in that case was that the majority shareholder's failure to provide them with
advance notice of an impending merger constituted a material nondisclosure. In
what has become a most important footnote fourteen, the Court rejected this
contention, reasoning that the plaintiffs had not indicated how they might have
acted differently had they received such prior notice: "Indeed, they accept the
conclusion of both courts below that under Delaware law they could not have
enjoined the merger because an appraisal proceeding is their sole remedy in the
Delaware courts for any alleged unfairness in the terms of the merger."'4 2 Ac-
cordingly, the Court concluded that the failure to provide advance notice was
35 See note 23 supra; Bishop, Derivative Suits Agaist Bank Directors: New Problems, New Strategies, 97
BANKING L.J. 158 (1980); Steinberg, supra note 34, at 1-2.
36 See note 31 supra.
37 See notes 32-33 supra. As the Cramer court stated:
[W]e do not think that the business judgment of the directors should be totally insulated from
judicial review. In order for the directors' judgment to merit judicial deference, that judgment
must have been made in good faith and independently of any influence of those persons sus-
pected of wrongdoing. In addition, where the shareholder contends that the directors' judg-
ment is so unwise or unreasonable as to fall outside the permissible bounds of the directors'
sound discretion, a court should, we think, be able to conduct its own analysis of the reasonable-
ness of that business judgment.
582 F.2d at 275. See Steinberg, supra note 34, at 28 (when the directors' alleged actions involve conflicts of
interests, fraud, or self-dealing, dismissal may not be proper). In such situations, a court "should, when
appropriate, give special consideration to matters of law and public policy in addition to the corporation's
best interests." Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, __ A.2d __, __ (Del. 1981).
38 See, e.g., Genzer v. Cunningham, 498 F. Supp. 682, 693 (E.D. Mich. 1980); Gyrnberg v. Farmer,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 97,683, at 98,586 (D. Col. Oct. 8, 1980); Zapata Corp.
v. Maldonado, __ A.2d - (Del. 1981).
39 See Steinberg, supra note 34, at 25-26.
40 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
41 Id at 473-74.
42 Id at 474 n.14.
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not a material nondisclosure within the meaning of section 10(b) and rule 10b-
5.43
Significantly, however, after Santa Fe, the Delaware Supreme Court in Singer
v. Magnovox Co. 44 held that appraisal is not a minority shareholder's sole remedy,
stating that a long-form merger "made for the sole purpose of freezing out minor-
ity shareholders, is an abuse of the corporate process; and . . .states a cause of
action for violation of a fiduciary duty. '45 Moreover, the court concluded that
even if a valid business purpose were shown, the transaction must be scrutinized
for its entire fairness. 46 Subsequent Delaware cases have reaffirmed and ex-
tended Singer's principles.4 7 Decisions of other state courts, although not strictly
in adherence with Singer,48 also recognize that appraisal is not a minority share-
holder's exclusive remedy when the merger has not been consummated. 4 9
Based on these decisions and on Santa Fe's footnote fourteen, the Second,
43 Id The Court's decision was widely viewed by commentators as sharply curtailing the scope of
section 10(b). See, e.g., Campbell, Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analysis Two Years Later, 30
MAINE L. REx. 187 (1979): Jacobs, Rule lob-5 and Sef Dealing by Corporate Fiduciaries.- An Analysis, 48 U.
CIN. L. REV. 643 (1979); Ratner, "Federal Corporation Law" Before andAfter Santa Fe Industries v. Green, in
NINTH ANNUAL INSTrIUTE ON SECURITIES REGULATION-CORPORATE TRANSCRIPT SERIES 305, 322
(Fleischer, Lipton & Vandegrift eds. 1978); Note, Suits for Breach of Fiduciamy Duy Under Rule lOb-5 After
Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874 (1978).
44 380 A.2d 969 (Del. 1977).
45 Id at 980.
46 The court stated:
On the contrary, the fiduciary obligation of the majority to the minority stockholders re-
mains and proof of a purpose, other than such freeze-out, without more, will not necessarily
discharge it. In such case the Court will scrutinize the circumstances for compliance with the
Sterh'ig rule of "entirefairness" and, if it finds a violation thereof, will grant such relief as equity
may require.
Id
47 As stated by the author:
Singer was the harbinger of a new era in Delaware. Subsequent Delaware cases have con-
firmed and extended the viability of Singer's principles. From these decisions, a number of gen-
eral principles can be proffered: a majority shareholder's fiduciary duty is not fulfilled simply
by relegating the minority stockholders to their statutory appraisal remedy; majority sharehold-
ers cannot effect a merger solely for the purpose of eliminating the minority; such a merger must
be for a proper purpose and must be entirely fair to the minority; a merger made primarily to
advance the business purpose of a majority stockholder is proper so long as it has a bona fide
purpose and is entirely fair to the minority; and where a complaint alleges that the purpose of
the merger was to eliminate minority shareholders, such a complaint may often be immune
from a motion to dismiss. The foregoing principles are applicable to short-form as well as long-
form mergers.
Ferrara & Steinberg, A Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule lOb-5and/he New Federahsm, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263,
278-80 (1980), citing Roland Int'l Corp. v. Najjar, 407 A.2d 1032 (Del. 1979); Tanzer v. International Gen.
Indus., Inc., 379 A.2d 1121 (Del. 1977); Young v. Valhi, Inc., 382 A.2d 1372 (Del. Ch. 1978); Kemp v.
Angel, 381 A.2d 241 (Del. Ch. 1977). See also Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 426 A.2d 1333 (Del. Ch. 1981).
For additional discussion of Singer, see Brudney & Chirelstein, A Restatement of Corporate Freezeouts, 87 YALE
L.J. 1354 (1978); Rothschild, Going Private, Singer, and Rule 13e-3. What Are the Standards for Fiduciaries?, 7
SEC. REG. L.J. 195 (1979); Comment, Delaware Reverses Its Trend in Going Private Transactions: The Forgotten
Majority, 11 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 567 (1978); Comment, Singer v. Magnovox and Cash Take-Out Mergers, 64
VA. L. REV. 1101 (1978).
48 See, e.g., In re Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 488 Pa. 524, 412 A.2d 1099 (1980) (state legislature
intended that appraisal statute serve as sole postmerger remedy); Gabhart v. Gabhart, 267 Ind. 370, 370
N.E.2d 345 (1977) (adopting only the first prong of Singer). But see Perl v. IU Int'l Corp., 607 P.2d 1036
(Hawaii 1980) (following Singer). Seegenerally Jones v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., I Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464,
81 Cal. Rptr. 592 (1969) (as interpreted by the Hawaii Supreme Court, "[ajlthough Ahmanson did not
involve a merger, it appears clear from the language of the opinion that the California Supreme Court
would apply the fiduciary duty of good faith and inherent fairness to such a situation." 607 P.2d at 1047
n.12).
49 See note 48 supra; Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 281; Steinberg, State Court Decisions After
Santa Fe, 9 SEc. REG. L.J. 85 (1981).
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Third, Fifth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have generally held that, where there
has been a material nondisclosure that would have enabled the shareholder to
seek injunctive relief in a state court to prevent the consummation of a transac-
tion, such nondisclosure constitutes "deception" within the meaning of section
10(b).50 The leading case adhering to this rationale is the Second Circuit's deci-
sion in Goldberg v. Meridor.
5
1
There are, however, a number of limitations to the Goldberg rationale. For
example, management is under no obligation to disclose to shareholders its own
breaches of fiduciary duty. As the Third Circuit stated, to hold otherwise "would
clearly circumvent the Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe."52 Another limita-
tion is that where a particular matter does not require shareholder approval, full
disclosure to a disinterested board of directors is deemed equivalent to full disclo-
sure to the shareholders. Stated differently, the disinterested directors'
knowledge is attributed to the corporation, thereby precluding a finding of de-
ception.5 3 This limitation generally seems well-founded, since directors are
elected to consider such matters.54 However, if the term "disinterested" is de-
fined too broadly, recalcitrant management will be able to undermine the
Goldberg rationale in instances where shareholder approval is not required.
Accordingly, a director should not be deemed "disinterested" merely be-
cause he lacks a financial stake in the subject transaction.55 Other disabilities,
such as conflicts of interest, the design of "entrenchment," and the perpetration
of improper influence by control persons, should also disqualify a director. 56 The
presence of any such disability should be held to impair the director's ability to
exercise independent judgment on the corporation's behalf, and should give rise
to a requirement that management obtain shareholder approval of the transac-
tion after full disclosure.
5 7
Further, some courts have construed the term "disinterested" broadly to in-
50 See Healey v. Catalyst Recovery, Inc., 616 F.2d 641 (3d Cir. 1980); Alabama Farm Bureau Mut.
Cas. Co. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602 (5th Cir. 1979), cerL. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1980);
Kidwell er re. Penfold v. Meikle, 597 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1979); Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209 (2d
Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978); Wright v. Heizer Corp., 560 F.2d 237 (7th Cir. 1977), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 1066 (1978). A question that remains open is whether a shareholder must show not only
that he could have brought suit in state court but also that he would have prevailed in the state court
action. The courts are deeply split on this issue. See Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 291-94.
51 567 F.2d 209 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978). The Second Circuit subsequently
reaffirmed the Goldberg rationale in IIT v. Cornfeld, 619 F.2d 909, 917 (2d Cir. 1980).
52 Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978). The court further reasoned:
Santa Fe made clear that absent deception, misrepresentation, or nondisclosure a breach of
fiduciary duty does not violate the statute or Rule. . . .In effect, appellants are stating that the
failure to disclose the breach of fiduciary duty is a misrepresentation sufficient to constitute a
violation of the Act. We refuse to adopt this approach which would clearly circumvent the
Supreme Court's holding in Santa Fe.
Id
53 Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1979) (since the amendments modifying the stock
option plan were "validly enacted by a vote of disinterested board members who had been fully informed
of all material facts, their knowledge was attributable to the Corporation and no 'deception' occurred
within the meaning of Rule lOb-5"). See also Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555, 565-66 (S.D.N.Y.
1979).
54 See notes 8-9 supra and accompanying text.
55 See Tyco Labs., Inc. v. Kimball, 444 F. Supp. 292 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Falkenberg v. Baldwin, [1977-78
Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1 96,086 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
56 See Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d 789, 795 (2d Cir. 1979); Kaplan v. Bennett, 465 F. Supp. 555,
565 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Goldberger v. Baker, 442 F. Supp. 659, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
57 See Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 290.
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clude directors who have other substantial contacts with the corporation, such as
serving as outside counsel, as a major supplier, or having some other present or
previous similar association. 58 This construction of "disinterested" leaves open
the door for management to appoint such persons to the board and to delegate to
them the decisionmaking functions whenever management is interested, such as
in regard to particular remuneration benefits, and the determination is not rele-
gated to the shareholders. 59 In such a situation, "[t]ruly independent actions by
either the lawyer or the supplier might well signify a substantial reduction in
income." 60 Yet, by labelling such persons "disinterested," the courts forever fore-
close shareholders from challenging the propriety of these transactions. Such a
broad construction is contrary both to the federal disclosure policy underlying
the Goldberg rationale and to the maintenance of corporate accountability.
D. True Purpose Cases
The true purpose cases stand for the proposition that the securities laws re-
quire objective disclosure rather than subjective revelation. 6 ' Nearly twenty-five
years ago, Judge Rifkind posed the following question, then answered it in the
negative: "Assuming that data are supplied, is the proxy statement nevertheless
false if it omits a confession of selfish motive?" 6 2 As one authority has remarked:
"It is not necessary to say, 'this is a grossly unfair transaction in which the board
of directors is overreaching the minority shareholders.' You just have to give
them the facts."' 63 Or, as the Third Circuit put it: "[T]he unclean heart of a
director is not actionable, whether or not it is disclosed, unless the impurities are
58 See Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Maldonado v. Flynn, 597 F.2d
789, 794 (2d Cir. 1979).
59 See 597 F.2d at 793-95 (amendments modifying stock option plan that inured to direct benefit of
recipient-directors).
60 Ferrara & Steinberg, supra note 47, at 290.
In Alaldonado, however, the Second Circuit concluded that a director who was a partner in a law firm
that received substantial fees from the subject corporation was "disinterested." The court reasoned:
IT]o label . . . Icounsell an 'interested' director for purposes of Rule lOb-5 because of his rela-
tionship as the company's legal counsel would be to open the door to an unworkable standard
for determining whether there has been deception practiced upon the corporation. . . . [W]e
cannot assume that a counsel-director acts for reasons that are against the corporation's interest,
as distinguished from the private interests of its officers.
597 F.2d at 794.
For articles discussing Santa Fe and its progeny see, e.g., Block & Schwarzfeld, Corporate Mismanagement
and Breach of FiduciaO, Duty After Santa Fe v. Green, 2 CORt. L. REV. 91 (1979); Campbell, Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green: An Analysir Two Years Later, 30 ME. L. REV. 187 (1979); Ferrara & Steinberg, A
Reappraisal of Santa Fe: Rule 10b-.5andthe New Federalism, 129 U. PA. L. REV. 263 (1980); Jacobs, Rule /0b-5
and Self Dealing By Corporate Fiduciaries: An Analysis, 48 CiN. L. REv. 643 (1979); Note, Suits for Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Under Rule 10-5 Afer Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1874 (1978);
Note, Goldberg v. Meridor: The Second Circuit's Resurrection of Rule 10b-5 Liability for Breaches of Corporate
Fiduciap , Duties to AMi'nority Shareholders, 64 VA. L. REV. 765 (1978).
61 See, e.g., Selk v. St. Paul Ammonia Products, Inc., 597 F.2d 635, 639 (8th Cir. 1979) (failure to
disclose that purpose of merger was to freeze-out minority shareholders not actionable under sections 10(b)
and 14(a)); O'Brien v. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 593 F.2d 54, 60 (7th Cir. 1979) (failure
to reveal that investment advice was self-serving not actionable under section 10(b)); Gluck v. Agemian,
[1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,582, at 98,090 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) ("disclosure of
subjective motive is not required under the federal securities laws"); Hundahl v. United Benefit Life Ins.
Co., 465 F. Supp. 1349, 1364 (N.D. Tex. 1979) (failure to disclose breach of fiduciary duty or scheme to
undervalue company not actionable under section 10(b)).
62 Doyle v. Milton, 73 F. Supp. 281, 286 (S.D.N.Y. 1947).
63 Ratner, supra note 43, at 322.
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translated into actionable deeds or omissions both objective and external." '64
Thus, management is under no obligation to describe a particular matter in pejo-
rative terms65 or to disclose its true purpose or motivation.
6 6
The problem in this context principally occurs when management under-
takes a course of conduct designed to maintain its own control. Although corpo-
rate control is acknowledged to be of universal interest to incumbent
management, 6 7 when management embarks on a program or adopts a policy for
the purpose of perpetuating its control, the nondisclosure of such purpose can
ultimately harm the corporation and its shareholders. Recognizing this fact, the
Fifth Circuit recently found actionable under section 10(b) an allegation that
management had failed to disclose that it "had embarked on a program of main-
taining control at the cost of inflating stock prices."'68 Further, the Second Cir-
cuit has implied that when management's design hinges upon so-called
"entrenchment," rather than its obvious interest in company control, then disclo-
sure of such design will be required.
69
As a general proposition, if these true purpose cases are construed too
broadly, management can undertake practically any course of action to perpetu-
ate its control and never be required to disclose its ultimate design. For example,
in order to maintain control, management may decide that the corporation
should remain an independent entity. To this end, management may embark on
a stock repurchase program for the purpose of raising stock prices to deter poten-
tial acquirors, may enter other lines of business to pose antitrust obstacles for
potential bidders, and may seek shareholder approval for adoption of a number
of anti-takeover amendments to further solidify its position.70 Yet, under a broad
true purpose construction, management is under no obligation to disclose that it
has engaged in these actions in order to perpetuate its control.
On the other hand, it is contrary to management's self-interest to reveal its
intent in such a context and, with the advice of counsel, legitimate business rea-
sons can be formulated to justify the action taken. The same beneficial disclosure
result, however, can usually be achieved by requiring that the eect of the action
be disclosed. Thus, in each of the examples above, management should be re-
quired to disclose that the effect of its action is to solidify management's control
and to render hostile takeover bids less probable and, if made, less likely to suc-
ceed.7 1 If such disclosure is made, the shareholder generally will receive all the
64 Biesenbach v. Guenther, 588 F.2d 400, 402 (3d Cir. 1978).
65 See Goldberg v. Meridor, 567 F.2d 209, 218 n.8 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1069 (1978).
66 See notes 62-65 supra and accompanying text.
67 See Rodman v. The Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 1979).
68 Alabama Farm Bureau Mut. Cas. Co., Inc. v. American Fidelity Life Ins. Co., 606 F.2d 602, 614
(5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 77 (1980).
69 Rodman v. The Grant Foundation, 608 F.2d at 71. See also Vaughn v. Teledyne, Inc., 628 F.2d
1214, 1221 (9th Cir. 1980) ("Corporate officials are under no duty to disclose their precise motive or
purpose for engaging in a particular course of corporate action, so long as the motive is not manipulative
or deceptive and the nature and scope of any stock transactions are adequately disclosed to those in-
volved."); Steinberg, Fiduciagy Duties and Disclosure Obligations in Proxy and Tender Contestsfor Corporate Control,
30 EMORY L.J.- (1981). See also SEC v. C & R Clothiers, Inc., [1980 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP.
(CCH) 97,650 (D.D.C. 1980) (consent).
70 See generally Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir. 1981); Treadway Cos. v. Care
Corp., 638 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1980); Berman v. Gerber Prod. Co., 454 F. Supp. 1310 (W.D. Mich. 1978);
Johnson, Disclosure in Tender Ofer Transactions: The Dice are Still Loaded, 42 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 33-34 (1980);
Lynch & Steinberg, supra note 20, at 928-38.
71 See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 15230 (Oct. 1978): "[Tjhe issuer's proxy material or infor-
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information he needs to make an informed decision regarding whether, for exam-
ple, to sell or retain his stock, to seek the removal of incumbent management, or
even to bring suit in state court alleging that management has breached its
fiduciary duty.
E. Disclosure of Anhisocial, Unethical, or Unlawful Policies
A troublesome issue is whether management must disclose, particularly in
proxy solicitations for the election of directors, antisocial, unethical or unlawful
corporate policies. The rationale supporting nondisclosure is that claims for re-
quiring such disclosures are in fact simply a means by which shareholders can
question management's business judgment. To mandate disclosure would open
the floodgates for litigious shareholders to bring suit whenever they disagreed
with the efficacy or wisdom of management's policies. 72 Moreover, a rule requir-
ing disclosure of such policies is unworkable, since management is unlikely to
accuse itself of pursuing antisocial or illegal policies.
73
Nonetheless, a number of reasonable shareholders would often consider anti-
social policies material to their investment and voting decisions, particularly if
they have caused significant economic harm. Such information might be impor-
tant to shareholders in deciding, for example, which directors to vote for or
whether to tender stock in a takeover bid setting.74 Moreover, while many share-
holders undeniably wish only to maximize their investments, others seek to invest
in companies adhering to ethical, social, and legal norms. Failure to require dis-
closure on the ground that these shareholders are "unreasonable" or that the
information they seek is "immaterial" is inconsistent with fundamental principles
of corporate accountability. 75 Further, although courts should be circumspect
regarding adoption of principles that would require management to accuse itself
mation statements should disclose in a prominent place that the overall effect of the proposal is to render
more difficult the accomplishment of mergers or the assumption of control by a principal stockholder, and
thus to make difficult the removal of management."
72 See Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 475 F.
Supp. 328 (S.D.N.Y. 1979),dismz'sedas moot, [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,814 (2d
Cir. Jan. 9, 1981): "As to plaintiffs' allegation that [defendant's] labor policy has resulted in significant
expenses, management is clearly not required to submit in proxy statements seeking reelection of directors
all business judgments whenever it would be possible for shareholders to disagree with their efficacy or
wisdom." Id at 331. See also Gaines v. Haughton, [Current] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 98,000 (9th Cir.
May 18, 1981).
73 Id. at 332-33. See SEC v. Chicago Helicopter Industries, Inc., Civ. No. 79C0469 (N.D. Ill. 1980)
("It is unlikely that the materiality requirement of § 10(b) was ever intended to require management to
accuse itself of antisocial behavior."), discussed in SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) No. 595, A-4 (Mar. 18, 1981).
74 See Brief of the SEC in Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union, AFL-CIO v. J.P. Ste-
vens & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,814 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1981):
The Commission submits that the district court erred in concluding that the alleged omissions
were non-material as a matter of law because the trier of fact could reasonably conclude, first,
that the illegal policy which caused significant economic harm reflected adversely on the way in
which Stevens was being managed and, second, that this information would be important to
shareholders' decisions about whether to retain Stevens' directors.
75 See Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. SEC, 389 F. Supp. 689, 700 (D.D.C. 1974):
There are many so-called "ethical investors" in this country who want to invest their assets in
firms which are concerned about and acting on environmental problems of the nation. This
attitude may be based purely on a concern for the environment; but it may also proceed from
the recognition that awareness of and sensitivity to environmental problems is the mark of intel-
ligent management. Whatever their motive, this Court is not prepared to say that they are not
rational investors and that the information they seek is not material information within the
meaning of the securities laws.
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of antisocial behavior, to permit nondisclosure on the broad ground that man-
agement is not disposed to reveal such policies ignores the fact that, under well
established disclosure standards, management must disclose much that is con-
trary to its interests.
76
III. Conclusion
This article has focused on a number ofjudicial principles that, if construed
too broadly, serve to insulate recalcitrant management's otherwise illegal actions
from successful shareholder challenge. If interpreted properly, these principles
advance both the corporation's and shareholders' best interests. If courts are un-
duly solicitous toward management, however, corporate accountability will
needlessly suffer. In this regard, before holding that a particular action taken by
management is insulated from challenge by one of these principles, courts should
scrutinize the purposes underlying the relevant principle and determine whether
applying the principle in that setting would effectuate its purposes. Moreover,
the importance of affording shareholders, suing either derivatively or individu-
ally, the opportunity for redress should be a relevant consideration in determin-
ing whether a particular principle should be applied in a given case. Thus,
although courts should apply the business judgment rule and related judicial
principles in appropriate situations to shield management's conduct, they should
be careful to ensure that their processes are not used as a sword by recalcitrant
management to pierce legitimate shareholder interests.
76 See, e.g., Item 3(l) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.20 (1980). See generally Brief of the SEC,
Amalgamated Clothing and Textile Workers Union v. J.P. Stevens & Co., [1981 Transfer Binder] FED.
SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 97,814 (2d Cir. Jan. 9, 1981):
[Ilt is clear that future plans of a corporation must be disclosed where they are material and
legal, and there is no basis for concluding that disclosure obligations may be avoided by making
future illegal plans. The very concept of disclosure may be contrary to human nature, in that
management might prefer to conceal all unfavorable information about a company, including
such matters as financial losses. Nevertheless, the essence of the federal securities laws, as stated
in the preamble to the Securities Act of 1933, is "to provide full and fair disclosure."
Id (emphasis in original). See also Ferrara, Starr & Steinberg, Disclosure oInformation Bearing on Management
Integrity and Competenty, 76 Nw. U.L. REv. - (1981). Steinberg, supra note 69.
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